Purpose: Gamma Knife radiosurgery is a highly precise and accurate treatment technique for treating brain diseases with low risk of serious error that nevertheless could potentially be reduced. We applied the AAPM Task Group 100 recommended failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) tool to develop a risk-based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery.
plugs/inserts, overlooked target areas, and undetected machine mechanical failure during the morning QA process.
Conclusions:
The implementation of the FMEA approach for Gamma Knife radiosurgery enabled deeper understanding of the overall process among all professionals involved in the care of the patient and helped identify potential weaknesses in the overall process. The results of the present study give us a basis for the development of a risk based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery. The FMEA is a reliability study tool for the analysis of the postulated component failures in a system and the resultant effects on the system operations. 7 It was initially developed by the US military 8 and has been extensively used in a variety of industries and health care services. [9] [10] [11] The importance of a risk based quality management program for radiation therapy has come to the attention of the medical physics community in recent years owing to two facts. First, with the technology advances in equipment manufacturing and the development of various quality assurance protocols, conventional device specific physics QA measurements can be done with much higher precision than before. Second, many reported radiation therapy incidences resulted from incorrect or inappropriate use of radiation treatment devices due to miscommunication or misunderstanding rather than device failures. As such, the development of quality management programs that focuses on the design and execution of various radiotherapy processes has become a subject of significant interest in recent years. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] Following the recommendations from the AAPM task group report No. 100 (TG 100), the implementation of risk-based quality management for radiation therapy facilities may become a standard practice and a regulatory requirement in the future.
As the first step toward the development of a risk-based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery, we present in this work a FMEA study on the Gamma Knife radiosurgery process as performed at our institution following the methodologies described in the AAPM TG 100 report.
| MATERIALS AND METHOD

2.A.1 | Gamma Knife radiosurgery at our institution
More than 600 patients receive single fraction Gamma Knife radiosurgery treatments on a Leksell Gamma Knife Perfexion and a 4C at our institution annually. All the patients reported to the treatment suite at 5.30 a.m and were evaluated in one of the five exam rooms upon arrival. Each patient was cared for by a dedicated nurse during the entire treatment process. After the stereotactic coordinate frames were placed by the neurosurgical team shortly after 6.30 am, patients were transported to the radiology department for imaging.
Neurosurgical team members supervised the MR, CT, or Angiographic imaging appropriate for the pathology undergoing radiosurgery. Morning QA of the treatment machines and patient chart creation was performed by physicists starting at 6.30 a.m. The radiosurgical planning using GammaPlan workstation took place as soon as the first set of images was available, usually started by the neurosurgical team and joined by the radiation oncology team. Final approval of the plan and plan export were done by physicists. The written directive was signed by an authorized surgeon, a radiation 
2.A.2 | Process tree and failure modes
The FMEA on the Gamma Knife radiosurgery was conducted following the methodology of the FMEA on IMRT as described in the AAPM TG 100 report. A team consisting of medical physicists, radiation oncologists, neurosurgeons, radiation safety officers, nurses, and schedulers at our institution and an external physicist expert on Gamma Knife was formed for the FMEA study. A preliminary process tree was prepared by the physics group first. Discussions about the details of each component of the treatment process between the physicists and other six professional groups were followed. The process tree was then revised and presented to all team members for further discussions and revision until a final version was agreed on.
The failure modes table was generated following the same path.
A template with an initial version of the failure mode table was prepared by the physics group using the Microsoft Excel and distributed to other professional groups for revision and addition. Some potential failures could be detected and prevented by the treatment delivery system and were not included in the failure modes table.
Examples of these failure modes include wrong collimator on the 4C, wrong Gamma angle on the Perfexion etc.
2.A.3 | Scoring and risk prioritizing
The scoring process involved the medical physicists, two radiation oncologists, and three neurosurgeons who have been routinely involved in the Gamma Knife treatments. Three scores for the probability of occurrence (O), the severity (S), and the probability of no The identified failure modes were analyzed in term of the RPN scores and the severity scores for risk prioritizing. The five failure modes with the highest RPN scores and the five failure modes with the highest severity scores were sorted out as targets for improvement.
3 | RESULTS Figure 1 shows the process tree for Gamma Knife radiosurgery as performed at our institution. A total of 10 subprocesses and 53 steps were identified for a Gamma Knife procedure starting from the diagnosis to the post-treatment follow-ups and chart filing. One subprocess (frame placement) and 11 steps are directly related to the frame-based nature of Gamma Knife radiosurgery.
The neurosurgery team is essentially involved in all subprocesses of the process tree at our institution. The presence of the radiation oncology team during the frame placement and the imaging processes is not required. The role of the medical physicists starts from the treatment preparation subprocess.
Depending on the diagnosis and the location of the disease site, the course of a Gamma Knife treatment delivery process varies from patient to patient. On the Perfexion, Gamma angle change may be needed for some patients. On the 4C, helmet change, plug pattern, both the APS and the trunnion modes may be used for some patients. These details of the treatment delivery process were not documented in the process tree but were considered for the failure modes analysis.
Listed in Table 1 are the identified failure modes for Gamma
Knife radiosurgery with the potential causes of the failure, the potential effects on patient/staff, examples of the failure modes and the steps in the process tree that the failure modes are related to.
Also included in the table are the 
| DISCUSSION
A single fraction Gamma Knife procedure is designed to be a fast and efficient radiation delivery process that can be completed (frame on to frame off) within a few hours. Comparing to other radiosurgery techniques, the use of the stereotactic head frame for patient positioning also helps to eliminate many uncertainties at the imaging, the target delineation, and the treatment setup stages. No.
Step Potential failure modes the plastic lever is completely flush with the frame adapter and that no angulations are present. As a result of this study, we implemented a policy that requires a physicist to visually check the gap between the frame and the frame adaptor, the position of the lock and the latches before each treatment. The physics staff is also required to apply some force to the frame adaptor to ensure that it is firmly attached to the treatment couch. We also communicated with the manufacturer about the result of this investigation and emphasized from the user point of view the importance to refine the locking/docking mechanism of the frame adaptor.
Our physics QA process was reviewed and revised to address failure modes No. 28 "undetected mechanical failure" and No. 7
"bad fiducial box assembly". On the Perfexion, the docking of the frame adapter at the 70, 110 degree Gamma angles was added to the morning QA check in addition to the 90 degree gamma angle.
On the 4C, the frequency of the helmet micro-switch tests for all the four helmets was changed to weekly from monthly. A step was also added to the physics morning QA procedure to check the integrity of all the image boxes to be used, including the liquid in the MR fiducial box, the fiducials and the orientation markers on the CT/Angio boxes.
Failure modes No. 73 "inserts/plugs not secured" is related to the use of plugs on the Gamma Knife 4C for certain treatments. A plug pattern is usually generated for a specific helmet during the planning process and all the plugs are subsequently put in by a clinical staff member manually according to the treatment report printout. Previously our protocol was to have a second clinical staff member to visually verify the plug pattern and check the firmness of the plug positions using his/her hands. To reduce the occurrence of this failure mode, a second round of checks by a third staff member was added.
To reduce the potential damage from failure mode No. 38 with inadequate image leveling, a mandatory neuroimaging in-service on T A B L E 4 Failure modes with the highest severity scores for Gamma Knife Radiosurgery.
No.
Step
Potential failure modes | 167 the basics of the MR, CT, and the Angio imaging techniques was given to all clinical staff. A policy was also developed to require at least one T1 weighted image series and one T2 weighted image series for any MR based treatments, so that targets and critical structures can be drawn on different image sets and cross-checked when necessary.
Several of the failure modes with the highest severities scores did not get high RPN scores because of their low scores in both the occurrence and the detectability. The reason was that many QA procedures had already been developed and implemented over the years to prevent these dangerous failure modes from happening.
These procedures include patient ID double check, plug pattern check, and image adaptor position check etc.
It should be pointed out that the present study was conducted for the Gamma Knife radiosurgery procedures as performed at our institution. The results of the risk prioritizing process, the details of the failure mode table, and even the layout of the process tree might be different for other institutions, even though the bulk part of the FMEA should be the same for all Gamma Knife facilities.
| CONCLUSIONS
We have performed a FMEA study on Gamma Knife radiosurgery based on our experience with the treatments of more than 600 patients annually. The implementation of the FMEA approach was first an important self-learning process that enabled deeper understanding of the radiosurgery procedure among all professionals involved in the care of the patient. The identified weaknesses in the overall process were the primary target areas for the development of a risk based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery.
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